Counterparty risk measurement integrates two sources of risk: market risk, which determines the size of a firm's exposure to a counterparty, and credit risk, which reflects the likelihood that the counterparty will default on its obligations. Wrong-way risk refers to the possibility that a counterparty's default risk increases with the market value of the exposure. We investigate the potential impact of wrong-way risk in calculating a credit valuation adjustment (CVA) to a derivatives portfolio: CVA has become a standard tool for pricing counterparty risk and setting associated capital requirements. We present a method, introduced in our earlier work, for bounding the impact of wrong-way risk on CVA. The method holds fixed marginal models for market and credit risk while varying the dependence between them. Given simulated paths of the two models, we solve a linear program to find the worst-case CVA resulting from wrongway risk. The worst case can be overly conservative, so we extend the procedure by penalizing deviations of the joint model from a baseline model. By varying the penalty for deviations, we can sweep out the full range of possible CVA values for different degrees of wrong-way risk. Our method addresses an important source of model risk in counterparty risk measurement.
Introduction
Counterparty risk has taken on heightened importance since the failures of major derivatives dealers Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG Financial Products in 2008. Basel III includes a new capital charge for counterparty risk, which is among the largest changes to capital requirements for banks with major derivatives businesses (BCBS [1] ). Accurate measurement of counterparty risk is essential to financial stability, yet it presents significant modeling and computational challenges for industry participants.
Counterparty risk combines market exposure and credit risk. Market factors determine the size of a firm's exposure to a counterparty, and credit risk determines the likelihood that the counterparty will default, turning the exposure into a loss. The proper integration of these two sources of uncertainty is among the major challenges in counterparty risk measurement.
Wrong-way risk refers to the possibility that the two sources of risk move together, so that the market exposure increases just as the counterparty's risk of default increases. Wrong-way risk arises, for example, if one bank sells credit default swap protection on another bank with a similar profile. The value of the credit protection increases when the second bank faces financial difficulties; this is likely to be a scenario in which the bank that sold the protection is also at greater risk of default. In practice, the sources and nature of wrong-way risk are often less obvious.
The standard tool for quantifying counterparty risk in derivatives markets is the credit valuation adjustment (CVA). The CVA on a portfolio of derivatives is an adjustment to the market value of the portfolio to correct for the credit quality of the counterparty, relative to what the same trades would be worth with a hypothetical default-free counterparty. The CVA for a portfolio of derivatives will generally increase with wrong-way risk, but the correct degree of wrong-way risk is difficult to estimate in practice.
In Glasserman and Yang [8] , we introduced a method for bounding wrong-way risk -that is, for finding the largest CVA that is consistent with fixed models for market exposure and credit risk, letting the dependence between market factors and credit risk vary. The present article provides a simplified exposition of the method in our earlier paper and additional examples. Our earlier paper also contains more extensive references to the literature.
Our approach builds on a standard simulation framework for CVA calculation: paths of underlying market factors are simulated over time; a portfolio is revalued (often using approximations) at fixed dates along each path of the market model; and the counterparty's time to default is either simulated from a credit risk model or extracted from a credit curve. Given a set of paths of market exposures and the distribution of the time to default, we find the worst-case CVA by solving a linear programming problem. The linear program finds the assignment of default times to paths resulting in the largest possible CVA, given the constraints on the default time distribution and the set of paths simulated from the market model. As a byproduct, the dual variables associated with constraints on the marginal default time distribution provide sensitivities of the worst-case CVA to the default probabilities.
A strength of this approach is that it yields the largest possible CVA value consistent with given models for market factors and credit risk. Because it finds the worst-case wrong-way risk, this approach can also be too conservative. In Glasserman and Yang [8] , we extend the method by penalizing deviations from a baseline model and finding the resulting tempered CVA. With a large penalty for deviations, the tempered CVA will be close to the CVA under the baseline model; 2. Problem Formulation and Worst-Case CVA 3 with a small penalty, the tempered CVA will be close to the worst case found through the linear programming solution. A natural choice for the baseline model is to take market factors and credit risk to be independent of each other.
1 By varying the penalty for deviations, we can sweep out the full range of potential CVA values from the independent case to the worst possible wrong-way risk.
The penalized problem can no longer be solved through linear programming, but we formulate it as a tractable convex optimization problem. The special structure of the problem leads to a convenient solution through iterative rescaling of the rows and columns of a matrix.
Models that explicitly describe dependence between market factors and credit risk in CVA calculation include Brigo, Capponi, and Pallavicini [2] , Crépey [5] , Ghamami and Goldberg [7] , Hull and White [10] , and Rosen and Saunders [13] ; see Brigo, Morini, and Pallavicini [3] for an extensive overview of modeling approaches. See Canabarro and Duffie [4] and Gregory [9] for additional background on counterparty risk.
Problem Formulation and Worst-Case CVA
To help fix ideas, we start with an example. Consider a T -year foreign exchange forward contract between a U.S. bank, which receives U.S. dollar payments, and a foreign bank which receives its local currency. The contract has forward exchange rate K and notional size S. If the foreign currency weakens against the dollar, the foreign bank's credit quality is likely to deteriorate with its currency, just as the U.S. bank's exposure increases, so this transaction exhibits evident wrong-way risk.
Let U t be the exchange rate, measured as the number of units of the foreign currency paid in exchange for one U.S. dollar at time t. Assume this exchange rate follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process,
where Ū is the level toward which the exchange rate mean-reverts, and W t is a standard Brownian motion.
CVA measures the discounted expected loss of a portfolio at the counterparty's default, so its calculation involves the default time of the counterparty, denoted by τ , and the discounted value of the portfolio exposure with this counterparty at the time of its default, denoted by V (τ ). We assume that V (τ ) accounts for all netting and collateral agreements, and let R denote the recovery rate of the counterparty. Only the positive part of exposure V + (τ ) represents a loss at default, so the CVA for a fixed time horizon T is the expectation
given a joint law for the default time τ and the exposure V + (τ ).
CVA is usually calculated over a fixed set of dates, so set 0 = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t d = T , and t d+1 = ∞. The dates can be monthly or quarterly, or the payment dates of the underlying contracts.
We limit τ to values in {t 1 , . . . , t d , t d+1 } and let q j , j = 1, . . . , d + 1, denote the probability that default occurs at t k , or, more precisely that it occurs in the interval (t k−1 , t k ]. The default time distribution can be extracted from credit default swap spreads of the counterparty or from a more extensive credit risk model, such as a stochastic intensity model.
Simulation of market factors is used to generate exposure paths (V
, and the calculation of each V (t j ) needs to account for netting and collateral agreements and recovery rates if the counterparty were to default. In our foreign exchange example,
where δ is the discount rate and R is the recovery rate. The expectation gives the expected exposure of the contract at time t j , and this value is discounted to t 0 and adjusted for partial recovery. The market factor model (in this example the exchange rate dynamics) implicitly determines the law of the positive exposure path (V + (t 1 ), . . ., V + (t d )), and we denote this law by a probability measure
Let X denote this vector of positive exposures adjusted by recovery at the specified dates, and let Y be a vector of default indicators,
then CVA would reduce to the expectation of the inner product
if the joint law for X and Y were known.
However the joint law is in general unavailable and difficult to find because of limited data on the dependence between market factors and credit risk. With the marginals fixed, we need to assign a joint probability between X and Y to calculate CVA. As an upper bound, we seek to evaluate the worst-case CVA, defined by (1) Simulate path of all relevant market factors jointly. In our example, this requires simulating paths of the foreign exchange rate, (
(2) At each date t j , for each market scenario i, evaluate the expected exposure of the portfolio based on the market factors; discount and adjust by netting rules and take positive parts to get
The key point is that we assume the availability of independent copies of exposure paths and use them as input to our procedure.
Let X 1 , . . . , X N be N independent copies of X, and let Y 1 , . . . , Y N be N independent copies of Y . We can assume that p has no atoms, and we can then identify the empirical measure p N on R d
with the uniform distribution on the set {X 1 , . . . , X N }, where
In particular, each path X i gets equal weight 1/N . On the other hand, Y is supported on the finite set {y 1 , . . . , y d+1 }, with y 1 = (1, 0, . . ., 0), . . ., y d = (0, 0, . . ., 1), and y d+1 = (0, . . ., 0), and each y j has probability q(y j ). These probabilities may be known or estimated from simulation of N independent copies Y 1 , . . . , Y N of Y , in which case we denote the empirical frequency of each y j by q N (y j ), defined as
With simulations of X i and Y i for i = 1, . . . , N , and empirical marginals p N and q N , we can find the worst-case joint mass function P N ij on the set of pairs {(X i , y j ), i = 1, . . ., N , j = 1, . . . , d + 1}. Let Π(p N , q N ) be the set of joint mass functions with marginals p N and q N . We estimate (2.2) using CVA * = max
Letting C ij =< X i , y j > we can rewrite this estimate of the worst-case CVA as a linear programming Bounding Wrong-Way Risk 6 problem:
Constraint (2.6) ensures that the paths X 1 , . . . , X N of market factors get equal weight; constraint (2.7) ensures that the default-time distribution in the joint model has the correct marginal distribution. In our running example, we have
A nice feature of this problem is that it has the structure of a transportation problem, so that efficient algorithms are available, including a strongly polynomial algorithm; see Kleinschmidt and
Schannath [11] .
In Glasserman and Yang [8] , we have established the consistency of this estimator. In other words, we show there that the optimal value of the linear programming problem converges to CVA * in (2.2) as the sample size N increases.
The sensitivities of the worst-case CVA to the constraints on the marginal distributions are available from the solution of the dual to the linear program. Let a i and b j be dual variables associated with constraints (2.6) and (2.7), respectively. The dual problem is
Let (a * , b * ) be the dual optimal solution. Consider a vector of perturbations (∆q 1 , . . . , ∆q d+1 ) to the mass function q N with components that sum to zero (so that the perturbed probabilities sum to one). Suppose these perturbations are sufficiently small to leave the dual solution unchanged.
In particular, we can calculate the sensitivity of the worst-case CVA to a parallel shift in the credit curve by setting ∆q j = ∆, j = 1, . . . , d, and ∆q d+1 = −d∆, for sufficiently small ∆.
Tempering the Worst Case

3 Tempering the Worst Case
The worst-case joint distribution is useful because it provides a bound, but it is not likely to be achieved in practice. To address this point, we want to control the degree of wrong-way risk in the CVA calculation. We accomplish this by introducing a penalty term in the objective function that penalizes deviations of the joint probability from a baseline model. Putting greater weight on the penalty limits the degree of potential wrong-way risk and tempers the worst-case CVA.
Penalty Formulation
For the penalty, we need a notion of distance from one distribution to another. Among many possible choices, relative entropy, also known as Kullback-Leibler divergence, is particularly convenient.
For probability measures P and F on a common measurable space with F >> P , the relative entropy of P to F is defined as
Relative entropy is nonnegative, and D(P |F ) = 0 only if P = F . As a function of P , relative entropy D(P |F ) is convex in P and leads to a convex optimization problem. The problem can be solved through a simple algorithm, known as the iterative proportional fitting procedure. Relative entropy is not symmetric in its arguments, but we do not see this as a drawback because we think of the baseline model as a favored benchmark.
To be concrete, here we take the baseline model to assume independence between market factors and credit risk. This choice is convenient, but it is not critical. Let ν denote the independent joint law of X and Y , meaning that
for all measurable A, B ⊆ R d , and note that ν ∈ Π(p, q). Under this baseline model, we have the independent case CVA given by
< x, y > dp(x)dq(y).
In the penalty formulation, we seek a joint distribution that maximizes CVA with marginals p and q and at the same time penalizes the objective function by the relative entropy divergence of this joint distribution from the baseline model ν. The penalty formulation with parameter θ is as follows:
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With the solution µ * of (3.1), we get the tempered CVA
For θ = 0, the penalty becomes infinite unless µ = ν, in which case CVA 0 = CVA ν . For θ = ∞, the penalty term vanishes and we recover the worst-case linear program in Section 2, and CVA ∞ = CVA * . For θ ∈ (0, ∞), we find a tempered CVA interpolated between the independent case and the worst-case wrong-way risk. We will see that negative values of θ correspond to "right-way" risk in which the likelihood of default of the counterparty decreases with the market value of exposure.
As in Section 2, we use simulation samples of X and Y to form an optimization problem to estimate CVA θ . Let F ij denote the baseline joint probabilities; in the independent case, these are
given by F ij = q N (y j )/N , i = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . , d + 1. The finite penalty problem is
With P θ denoting the optimal solution to this problem, we estimate CVA θ by
In our earlier paper [8] , we established the consistency of this estimator of tempered CVA, showing that it converges to CVA θ as the sample size N → ∞
Algorithm
A general-purpose optimization method can be applied to solve the penalty problem in (3.3) because it is a convex program. However, a simple algorithm is available for solving this particular problem through the iterative proportional fitting procedure (IPFP) because we chose relative entropy in the penalty term. This method dates back to Deming and Stephan [6] and has applications in many areas; see Pulkelsheim [12] for an overview.
The IPFP method takes as input data a nonnegative matrix and row and column marginals.
The output is a matrix with the specified row and column sums equal to the input marginals. The output is the matrix closest to the input matrix, in the sense of relative entropy, among all matrices with the target row sums and column sums.
In applying this method in our setting, we start with an input matrix that represents an initial joint probability matrix weighted by the exposure at each possible default time. Then we iteratively fit this initial joint probability matrix to the target marginals of market factors and credit risk.
Sensitivity Through Dual Variables
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The procedure converges to a proper joint probability that satisfies the marginal constraints and also accounts for exposure weighting.
Define an N × (d + 1) matrix M θ with entries
The row index i = 1, . . ., N , is the market exposure path index, and the column index j = 1, . . . , d+ 1, is the default time index for t j . As before, F ij is the baseline model. Each C ij =< X i , y j > is the loss on exposure path i if the counterparty defaults at time t j . The parameter θ is the penalty parameter in the penalty problem. The matrix M θ emphasizes wrong-way risk because for θ > 0 it puts greater weight on the combinations of exposure path and default time that produce larger losses.
The denominator of M θ ij normalizes all entries to sum to one, but this matrix does not satisfy the target marginals p N and q N . The IPFP algorithm iteratively repeats the following steps:
After step (a), the new matrix has row sums equal to the market marginal p N , regardless of the marginals of the initial matix. After step (b), the new matrix has column sums equal to the credit risk marginal q N , however the row sums will no longer necessarily match p N . Let Φ(M ) denote the operation of applying both steps (a) and (b) to M , and write Φ (n) for the n-fold composition of Φ. We have shown in Glasserman and Yang [8] that as n → ∞, Φ (n) (M ) converges to a limit P θ with marginals p N and q N that solves the penalty problem (3.3). With θ < 0, the limit solves the penalty problem with max replaced by min, corresponding to right-way risk in the sense that it minimizes the CVA subject to the marginal constraints and the penalty on deviations from the baseline model.
Sensitivity Through Dual Variables
Consider the dual of the convex optimization problem in (3.3),
Let (a * , b * ) denote the optimal dual solution, and consider a vector of small perturbations (∆q 1 , . . . , ∆q d+1 )
to the marginal distribution q N with components that sum to zero. For perturbations small enough Bounding Wrong-Way Risk 10 to keep the dual solution unchanged, we can estimate the change in CVA, without resolving problem (3.3), using
We can calculate the sensitivity to a parallel shift in the credit curve by setting ∆q j = ∆, j = 1, . . . , d, and ∆q d+1 = −d∆, for sufficiently small ∆.
The dual solution can be obtained as a byproduct of the IPFP algorithm. The optimal primal
, where a and b are optimal dual variables, so we can define scalars u i and v j such that
j=1 e θ·C ij is the normalization term in M ij . Let r i (n) be the i-th row sum of Φ (n) (M ) and let c j (n) be the j-th column sum of Φ (n) (M ) after step (a) in the (n + 1)-th iteration. By Pukelsheim [12] ,
. 
Examples
In this section we illustrate the method with examples, starting with the example in Section 2.
Assume that the counterparty's default time has an exponential distribution with hazard rate λ = 0.04. The other model parameters are (U t 0 , Ū , K, κ, σ, δ, S) = (1000, 1000, 1000, 0.3, 50, 0.03, 10 6 ).
Assume the time horizon T is 10 years. We simulate N = 1000 paths, each divided into 20 time steps. After applying the algorithm in Section 3.2 for various values of θ, we get CVA values corresponding to different degrees of wrong-way risk (θ > 0) and right-way risk (θ < 0).
The CVA values are shown in Figure 1 , reported as a percentage of the independent case, for which θ = 0. The left panel shows how the CVA bound increases with θ, approaching the worst-case bound as θ becomes sufficiently large. At the other extreme, as θ becomes a large negative number, the CVA approaches zero. These results should be contrasted with the right panel, which shows the result of linking market factors and credit risk through a Gaussian copula, following Rosen and Saunders [13] . Dependence in the Gaussian copula is indexed by the correlation parameter ρ, which ranges from −1 to 1. Restricting the dependence between market factors and credit risk through a Gaussian copula does not achieve the full range of potential wrong-way risk. The right panel shows results using a Gaussian copula to link market factors and credit risk. The Gaussian copula does not achieve the full range of potential wrong-way risk.
In Figure 2 we show that varying the volatility of the market factor and the counterparty's default hazard rate have significant impact on CVA. Increasing either of these parameters shifts the curve up for θ > 0. Increasing the volatility of the market exposure or the level of the credit risk in this example increases the potential impact of wrong-way risk, relative to the benchmark of independent market and credit models. The sample average positive exposures for these three portfolios are shown in Figure 3 . In the top two panels, the average positive exposure increases with time because the largest payments are exchanged at maturity. For Portfolio 1, the drop in exposure at year three and year six results from the expiration of the foreign exchange forward contracts. For Portfolio 2, since the portfolio is more balanced, the exposure path is smoother. In the bottom panel, for Portfolio 3, the average positive exposure decreases to 0 at maturity because the total exposure decreases with time in an interest rate swap. Figure 4 shows CVA values as θ varies. We report CVA as a percentage of the Portfolio 2 CVA in the independent case. Portfolio 1 has the greatest sensitivity to wrong-way risk because all its transactions run in the wrong-way direction. Portfolio 2 is better diversified, with both wrongway and right-way transactions. Because the average positive exposure for Portfolio 1 is higher than that of Portfolio 2, it has a higher CVA for all θ, and with θ increasing, Portfolio 1 attains much higher CVA values near the worst-case bound than does the more diversified Portfolio 2. For Portfolio 3, because of its lower and less concentrated positive exposure, the CVA bound is much lower compared with the other two portfolios. Figure 5 shows the sensitivity of the CVA estimates to a change in the counterparty's default hazard rate. We increase the hazard rate by 1 basis point from λ = 0.04 to λ = 0.0401 and show the estimated change in CVA using dual variables and the actual difference based on resolving the optimization problem at each θ. To put these sensitivities in perspective, the CVA estimate Overall, the dual variables provide good estimates of the change in CVA under a small change in the default probability. Compared with resolving the optimization problem at the perturbed λ, the dual variables slightly underestimate the change in wrong-way scenarios (θ > 0) and overestimate the change in the right-way scenarios (θ < 0).
Concluding Remarks
We have presented and applied the method we developed in Glasserman and Yang [8] for bounding the effect of wrong-way risk in measuring counterparty risk through CVA. Our approach provides a practical way to find the largest possible CVA value consistent with separate models for market exposure and credit risk. In this sense, it addresses the model risk that arises from the uncertain dependence between market factors and credit risk. Our penalty formulation tempers the worst-case CVA by allowing the user to control the degree of wrong-way risk.
An important practical problem is the choice of the penalty parameter θ, which reflects the user's confidence in the baseline model. A large θ leads to more conservative values; a small θ produces values very close to the baseline. Inevitably, the choice of θ involves some judgment. However, this judgment is best anchored in observable data. In our examples, each value of θ implies some level of correlation between the exchange rate and the credit spread for the counterparty. This correlation is a limited measure that cannot determine the full dependence between the market and credit models, but it can help pin down an appropriate value for θ. 
